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LEGISLATING DATA LOYALTY
Woodrow Hartzog* & Neil Richards**
Lawmakers looking to embolden privacy law have begun to consider imposing duties of
loyalty on organizations trusted with people’s data and online experiences. The idea behind
loyalty is simple: organizations should not process data or design technologies that conflict with
the best interests of trusting parties. But the logistics and implementation of data loyalty need to
be developed if the concept is going to be capable of moving privacy law beyond its “notice and
consent” roots to confront people’s vulnerabilities in their relationship with powerful data
collectors.
In this short Essay, we propose a model for legislating data loyalty. Our model takes
advantage of loyalty’s strengths—it is well-established in our law, it is flexible, and it can
accommodate conflicting values. Our Essay also explains how data loyalty can embolden our
existing data privacy rules, address emergent dangers, solve privacy’s problems around consent
and harm, and establish an antibetrayal ethos as America’s privacy identity.
We propose that lawmakers use a two-step process to (1) articulate a primary, general duty
of loyalty, then (2) articulate “subsidiary” duties that are more specific and sensitive to context.
Subsidiary duties regarding collection, personalization, gatekeeping, persuasion, and mediation
would target the most opportunistic contexts for self-dealing and result in flexible open-ended
duties combined with highly specific rules. In this way, a duty of data loyalty is not just appealing
in theory—it can be effectively implemented in practice just like the other duties of loyalty our law
has recognized for hundreds of years. Loyalty is thus not only flexible, but it is capable of
breathing life into America’s historically tepid privacy frameworks.

INTRODUCTION
American privacy law is in a rut. It has no privacy identity. Its
traditional rules mandating transparency and consent are outdated,
© 2022 Woodrow Hartzog & Neil Richards. Individuals and nonprofit institutions
may reproduce and distribute copies of this Essay in any format at or below cost, for
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porous, and poorly enforced. It is a far cry from the “adequacy”
necessary for a profitable and sustainable data trade with the European
Union (EU) and Britain. It has, in short, proven no match for the likes
of the modern tech giants and a world awash in data and devices.
What’s worse, while privacy reform appears to be on the agenda, many
of the existing proposals—particularly those touted as “businessfriendly”—are so weak as to risk codifying a privacy rights status quo
that virtually everyone agrees is unacceptable.1 In searching for a
meaningful new approach to regulating data privacy, lawmakers have
begun to seriously explore the idea that tech companies should be
bound by a duty of loyalty to those who trust them with their data and
online experiences.2
Scholars have proposed versions of a duty of loyalty for the past
twenty years, but not all lawmakers are convinced.3 Some may be
1 This is an argument we have been making for several years. See e.g., Woodrow
Hartzog & Neil Richards, Opinion, There’s a Lot to Like About the Senate Privacy Bill, if It’s Not
Watered Down, THE HILL (Dec. 6, 2019), https://thehill.com/opinion/technology/472892theres-a-lot-to-like-about-the-senate-privacy-bill-if-its-not-watered [https://perma.cc/W87YZGPG]; Woodrow Hartzog & Neil Richards, Opinion, It’s Time to Try Something Different on
Internet Privacy, WASH. POST (Dec. 20, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions
/its-time-to-try-something-different-on-internet-privacy/2018/12/20/bc1d71c0-0315-11e99122-82e98f91ee6f_story.html [https://perma.cc/W63X-UHCP].
2 See, e.g., Data Care Act of 2019, S. 2961, 116th Cong. § 3(b)(2) (2019) (Duty of
Loyalty—An online service provider may not use individual identifying data, or data derived
from individual identifying data, in any way that—(A) will benefit the online service
provider to the detriment of an end user; and (B) (i) will result in reasonably foreseeable
and material physical or financial harm to an end user; or (ii) would be unexpected and
highly offensive to a reasonable end user); Consumer Online Privacy Rights Act, S. 2968,
116th Cong. § 101 (2019) (Duty of Loyalty. (a) In General.—A covered entity shall not—
(1) engage in a deceptive data practice or a harmful data practice; or (2) process or transfer
covered data in a manner that violates any provision of this Act); New York Privacy Act, S.
5642, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019) (“Every legal entity, or any affiliate of such entity,
and every controller and data broker, which collects, sells or licenses personal information
of consumers, shall exercise the duty of care, loyalty and confidentiality expected of a
fiduciary with respect to securing the personal data of a consumer against a privacy risk;
and shall act in the best interests of the consumer, without regard to the interests of the
entity, controller or data broker, in a manner expected by a reasonable consumer under
the circumstances.”); Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of
the Council on European Data Governance (Data Governance Act), COM (2020) 767 final (Nov.
25, 2020); Data Protection Act 2018, c. 123 (UK); An Act to Provide Facial Recognition
Accountability and Comprehensive Enforcement, H.R. 117, 192d Gen. Ct., §2(a) (Mass.
2021) (“A covered entity shall be prohibited from taking any actions with respect to
processing facial recognition data or designing facial recognition technologies that conflict
with an end user’s best interests.”).
3 See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, The Fiduciary Model of Privacy, 134 HARV. L. REV. F. 11 (2020)
[hereinafter Balkin, The Fiduciary Model]; Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First
Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1183 (2016) [hereinafter Balkin, Information Fiduciaries];
Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, A Duty of Loyalty for Privacy Law, 99 WASH. U. L. REV.
961 (2021) [hereinafter Richards & Hartzog, Duty of Loyalty]; Lauren Henry Scholz,
Fiduciary Boilerplate: Locating Fiduciary Relationships in Information Age Consumer Transactions,
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concerned that it is too vague, or that it would be bad for business.
Others wonder what data loyalty would get us that we couldn’t get from
EU or California-style statutes. Others are uncertain about how a duty
of loyalty would work and what specific legislation for data loyalty
should look like.
In this short Essay, we propose a model for legislating data loyalty.
Our model takes advantage of loyalty’s strengths—it is well-established
in our law, it is flexible, and it can accommodate conflicting values.
Our Essay also explains how data loyalty can and should fit within the
existing fabric of information privacy law, building on our research
exploring how better privacy rules can protect and build trust in
relationships between consumers and companies. It lays out the what
and the why of data loyalty for legislators seeking a robust alternative
to the failed “notice-and-choice” regime in the United States.
Our argument is simple—a duty of data loyalty is not just
appealing in theory—it can be effectively implemented in practice just
like the other duties of loyalty our law has recognized for hundreds of
years. Loyalty is not only flexible, but it is capable of breathing life into
America’s historically tepid privacy efforts. It is a meaningful
alternative to ineffective regimes that rely too much upon illusory
notions of consent and restrictive notions of harm, while being flexible
enough to confront new privacy challenges and accommodating
mutually beneficial data practices. A properly implemented duty of
loyalty could thus represent an answer to many of the problems of
information privacy, creating real value for consumers, businesses, and
our society as a whole.

46 J. CORP. L. 143 (2020); see also ARI EZRA WALDMAN, PRIVACY AS TRUST: INFORMATION
PRIVACY FOR AN INFORMATION AGE (2018); Claudia E. Haupt, Platforms as Trustees:
Information Fiduciaries and the Value of Analogy, 134 HARV. L. REV. F. 34 (2020); Lilian
Edwards, The Problem with Privacy: A Modest Proposal, 18 INT’L REV. L. COMPUTS. & TECH. 309
(2004); Christopher W. Savage, Managing the Ambient Trust Commons: The Economics of Online
Consumer Information Privacy, 22 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 95 (2019); Jonathan Zittrain,
Engineering an Election, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 335, 340 (2014); Lindsey Barrett, Confiding in
Con Men: U.S. Privacy Law, the GDPR, and Information Fiduciaries, 42 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1057
(2019); Ariel Dobkin, Information Fiduciaries in Practice: Data Privacy and User Expectations, 33
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 1 (2018); Cameron F. Kerry, Why Protecting Privacy Is a Losing Game
Today—and How to Change the Game, BROOKINGS (July 12, 2018), https://
www.brookings.edu/research/why-protecting-privacy-is-a-losing-game-today-and-how-tochange-the-game/ [https://perma.cc/L8DQ-SK79]; Ian R. Kerr, The Legal Relationship
Between Online Service Providers and Users, 35 CANADIAN BUS. L.J. 419 (2001); Richard S.
Whitt, Old School Goes Online: Exploring Fiduciary Obligations of Loyalty and Care in the Digital
Platforms Era, 36 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 75 (2020); Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Fourth
Amendment Fiduciaries, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 611, 612 (2015); DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE
DIGITAL PERSON (2004); but see Lina M. Khan & David E. Pozen, A Skeptical View of
Information Fiduciaries, 133 HARV. L. REV. 497 (2019).
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WHAT IS DATA LOYALTY?

Data loyalty is the simple idea that the organizations we trust
should not process our data or design their tools in ways that conflict
with our best interests. It borrows from notions of loyalty in fiduciary
law, but it is distinct from them. The model we propose here would be
crafted by legislators to the specific vulnerabilities and incentives in the
relationships between consumers and the data-extractive companies
they deal with every day.
Scholars have proposed duties of loyalty in a variety of forms—
including loyalty duties for data collectors, “information fiduciaries,”
or fiduciary boilerplate—in part because loyalty represents a
substantive check on the ability of companies to use human data to
nudge, influence, coerce, and amass vast profits from the exploitation
of human information.4 It cannot be avoided by trickery, hidden fine
print, or manipulative interfaces known as “dark patterns.” At its core,
it protects the expectations consumers bring to relationships with
companies, and it builds trust in those relationships that allows them
to flourish to the benefit of both parties.
In other work we have articulated a duty for loyalty for privacy law
as the duty of data collectors to act in the best interests of those whose
data they collect.5 A duty of loyalty for privacy law is neither perfect
nor a tool for all tasks. But loyalty has one great virtue: it places the
focus for information age problems on the relationships that define
our social lives rather than on the data which is the byproduct of those
relationships. Loyalty shifts the law’s attention from the procedural
rules of privacy law that are too easy to manipulate (“Did you hide a
vague sentence in the privacy policy?” “Did the consumer fail to hit
the tiny opt-out button?”) to the substantive question of what practices
go too far. It is flexible and adaptable across contexts, cultures, and
times. Loyalty can thus be a powerful response to what Shoshana

4 See, e.g., Balkin, The Fiduciary Model, supra note 3; Balkin, Information Fiduciaries,
supra note 3; Richards & Hartzog, Duty of Loyalty, supra note 3; Scholz, supra note 3; see also
WALDMAN, supra note 3; Haupt, supra note 3; Edwards, supra note 3; Savage, supra note 3;
Zittrain, supra note 3, at 340; Barrett, supra note 3; Dobkin, supra note 3, at 1; Kerry, supra
note 3; Kerr, supra note 3; Whitt, supra note 3; Brennan-Marquez, supra note 3, at 612;
SOLOVE, supra note 3.
5 See, e.g., Richards & Hartzog, Duty of Loyalty, supra note 3; Woodrow Hartzog & Neil
Richards, The Surprising Virtues of Data Loyalty, 71 EMORY L.J. (forthcoming 2022); Woodrow
Hartzog & Neil Richards, Privacy’s Constitutional Moment and the Limits of Data Protection, 61
B.C. L. REV. 1687 (2020) [hereinafter Hartzog & Richards, Privacy’s Constitutional Moment];
Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously in Privacy Law, 19 STAN. TECH. L.
REV. 431 (2016) [hereinafter Richards & Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously]; Neil Richards &
Woodrow Hartzog, The Pathologies of Digital Consent, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 1461 (2019)
[hereinafter Richards & Hartzog, Pathologies of Digital Consent]; Neil Richards & Woodrow
Hartzog, Privacy’s Trust Gap: A Review, 126 YALE L.J. 1180 (2017) (book review).
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Zuboff calls “surveillance capitalism,” the claiming of “human
experience as free raw material for hidden commercial practices of
extraction, prediction, and sales . . . As significant a threat to human
nature in the twenty-first century as industrial capitalism was to the
natural world in the nineteenth and twentieth.”6
Data loyalty has three key features—it is a (1) relational duty (2)
that prohibits self-dealing (3) at the expense of a trusting party. Let’s break
these three features apart.
A. A Relational Duty
Lawmakers who decide they want to regulate privacy can begin
their task by focusing on at least three different things. First, they
could focus on the data itself, like what can be collected and whether
datasets are deidentified. This is the approach that most federal and
European privacy laws have taken to date with laws like the General
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the California Consumer
Privacy Act (CCPA). Second, there are structural concerns, like
requiring companies to appoint a data privacy officer or focusing on
monopoly power. This is the approach familiar to antitrust and
corporate law. There’s also a third option—lawmakers could focus on
our relationships, like requiring confidentiality from physicians,
lawyers, and other professionals.7
In addition to being one of the oldest contexts for privacy to
flourish, relationships have a few distinct advantages for lawmakers
looking to fight the excesses and abuses of data-hungry organizations.
First, relational duties are acutely sensitive to the power disparities within
information relationships. Tech companies control what we see, what
we can click on, and what sorts of information they want to extract
from their customers. They have incredible resources that help them
predict and nudge our behavior and have the financial incentive to
keep us ever more exposed. Duties of loyalty protect against selfdealing, while related duties of care placed on relationships protect
against dangerous behavior and the risks of harm. The greater the
power imbalance and the more vulnerable people are through
exposure, so should the duty to which the trusted party is held be
greater.8
Second, relational duties are a way out of privacy’s consent trap. For
years lawmakers, regulators, and companies have been obsessing over
whether the consent people gave was a truly meaningful, informed,
and revocable choice. People click “I Agree” buttons and slightly
6 SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM: THE FIGHT FOR A
HUMAN FUTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF POWER, at vii (2019).
7 See Hartzog & Richards, Privacy’s Constitutional Moment, supra note 5, at 1697.
8 See, e.g., Balkin, The Fiduciary Model, supra note 3, at 13–14.
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wince without reading the terms because it is impossible to do so, even
when what they click states that they read and understand the terms.
Consent is broken, but lawmakers have stuck to notice and consent
regimes anyway, even though it is common knowledge that digital
consent is rarely meaningful. Relational duties allow for a decoupling
of choice and consent. These duties allow trusting parties to enter into
information relationships without accepting the risks of whatever
harmful data practices and consequences lurk in the fine print, the
business model, or the technology. They can also allow trusting parties
to select from a range of choices without fear of betrayal because they
would be protected no matter what they chose.9
Finally, relationships open the possibility of more robust
enforcement rules because they are voluntarily entered into and hold a
unique place in the law as a result. The concept of contractual privity
could also be used to extend relational duties beyond the initial
trusting party and entrustee. Under a “chain-link” approach to
relational privacy rules, lawmakers could directly—or using mandated
terms in data-sharing contracts—link the disclosure of personal
information to obligations of loyalty to protect information as it is
disclosed downstream.10 To create the chain of protection, contracts
would be used to link each new recipient of information to a previous
recipient who wished to disclose the information. At the same time,
relational duties raise even fewer free expression issues than other
forms of data regulation because they regulate relationships rather
than information flows. In relationships, parties assume these duties
by soliciting trust and voluntarily entering into these relationships.
Moreover, protections for power-imbalanced relationships have a deep
tradition in U.S. law in harmony with free expression frameworks. This
is, for example, why lawyers do not have a First Amendment right to
disclose client confidences, no matter how “newsworthy” they might
be.11
For these reasons, shifting the focus of privacy law from data to
relationships offers significant advantages for effective policy.

9 For an extended critique of consent-based models for data processing, see Richards
& Hartzog, Pathologies of Digital Consent, supra note 5.
10 See Woodrow Hartzog, Chain-Link Confidentiality, 46 GA. L. REV. 657, 658–61 (2012).
11 Cf. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries, supra note 3; Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech
and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About
You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1057–58 (2000) (explaining that enforcement of contracts to
maintain confidentiality create no First Amendment problems); Andrew J. McClurg, Kiss
and Tell: Protecting Intimate Relationship Privacy Through Implied Contracts of Confidentiality, 74
U. CIN. L. REV. 887 (2006). But see Khan & Pozen, supra note 3.

362

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW REFLECTION

[VOL. 97:5

B. That Prohibits Self-Dealing
Many of the problems of surveillance capitalism come down to the
problem of self-dealing, where an organization exploits an advantage
over a trusting party to its own benefit.12 The failures of American
privacy law have enabled such corporate opportunism and
manipulation of consumers using human information. This problem
is particularly serious in the context of “personalized” technologies
that promise to know us so that they can better satisfy our needs and
wants. Insufficiently constrained by privacy law and driven to
maximize quarterly profits by corporate law, companies can deploy a
potent cocktail of techniques derived from cognitive and behavioral
science to “nudge” or otherwise influence the choices we make.13
These highly capitalized tech companies have not acted like the
benevolent choice architects some had hoped for.14 Technologies—
and choice architecture—advertised as serving consumers have instead
become weaponized, serving commodified consumers up to the
companies and their commercial and political advertiser clients.15
Loyalty rules directly prohibit conflicted self-dealing. In so doing,
they can change the incentives and business models of entire
industries. Many critics believe that U.S. data privacy law has failed to
change the corrosive business models that endanger, manipulate,
mislead, misinform, and polarize people every day. The law, these
critics suggest, merely prunes the edges of wrongdoing rather than
getting to the core of the problem.16 A duty of data loyalty would
directly address this problem by taking self-dealing off the table as a
general matter. More specific, subsidiary data loyalty rules for targeted
advertising, web scraping, manipulative interfaces, and optimized
human engagement metrics could revolutionize entire industries with
clearer rules of the road. They could make certain abusive business
models obsolete overnight. This would be a sharp contrast to the
piecemeal and procedural approach of current U.S. data privacy law,
which presupposes that all possible extraction models can be valid if
they follow the right procedures and give people some semblance of
control over their information. Data loyalty rules instead look directly
to corporate profit motives and ask if they conflict with a trusting

12 See JULIE E. COHEN, BETWEEN TRUTH AND POWER: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF
INFORMATIONAL CAPITALISM (2019); ZUBOFF, supra note 6.
13 See NEIL RICHARDS, WHY PRIVACY MATTERS 39–50 (2022).
14 See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 11–13 (2008).
15 See RICHARDS, supra note 13, at 46–49.
16 See, e.g., Facebook, Inc., F.T.C. No. 1823109 (July 24, 2019) (Chopra, Comm’r,
dissenting); Facebook, Inc., F.T.C. No. 1823109 (July 24, 2019) (Kelly, Comm’r, dissenting).
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party’s best interests. They require profit models to be based on the
provision of valuable services rather than exploitation and extraction.
C. At the Expense of a Trusting Party
Loyalty rules safeguard trusting parties from betrayal, looking to
whether a trusting party has been disadvantaged by an organization’s
self-dealing. When organizations enrich themselves with trusting
parties’ data, people consistently end up paying with their time,
attention, mental well-being, reputation, and significant life
opportunities.17 These costs include everything from notifications
interrupting our attention to advance the interests of the platform, to
manipulative advertising that causes people to buy (or vote) differently
in ways that serve advertisers, to the well-documented emotional
injuries wrought by engagement-driven social media. Crucially, these
costs, impositions, and manipulations are made substantially more
damaging by “personalization” enabled by self-dealing in personal
data. Thus, it’s not just a random notification or one serving your
interests like a reminder to attend a meeting, but one teasing you out
of the blue that someone you know may have done something cool.
It’s not just an ad or a political message, but one calculated to your
precisely known psychology and vulnerabilities.18 And it’s not just
social media telling you what your friends are doing, it’s being done in
a way that is calibrated to push your buttons to keep you scrolling (or
doom-scrolling) with a reckless indifference to your mental health.19
The scope of protection that loyalty rules safeguard includes, but
is broader than, recognized privacy harms like identity theft, emotional
harms, breaches of confidence, and dangerous exposure.20 It also
includes more subtle individual and collective costs to our identity, our
ability to create relationships, our collectively held truths, and the
obscurity that protects our ability to share and move about freely. As

17 See Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Against Engagement (draft manuscript) (on
file with authors).
18 This is precisely what happened in the Cambridge Analytica scandal, in which
Facebook data was used to create finely calibrated psychological profiles of voters identified
by their real names, suggesting which kinds of arguments would be most effective at getting
them to act in the ways that the paying political advertisers wanted them to. See RICHARDS,
supra note 13, at 25–26.
19 These are the allegations Facebook whistleblower Frances Haugen presented
under oath before lawmakers in the United States and around the world in 2021. See, e.g.,
Billy Perrigo, Inside Frances Haugen’s Decision to Take on Facebook, TIME (Nov. 22, 2021)
https://time.com/6121931/frances-haugen-facebook-whistleblower-profile/ [https://per
ma.cc/L8QN-6GD5].
20 See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy Harms, 102 B.U. L. REV.
793 (2022); M. Ryan Calo, The Boundaries of Privacy Harm, 86 IND. L.J. 1131 (2011).
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such, it protects against the full range of betrayals that powerful parties
in an information relationship can engage in.
*

*

*

Loyalty duties are thus quite straightforward when understood as
relational duties that prevent self-dealing at the expense of a trusting
party. They accord with basic notions of fairness and decency—if you
have power over someone who trusts you, you shouldn’t betray them
or manipulate them to serve your own interests. It is undoubtedly for
these reasons that our law has placed duties of loyalty on relationships
with power imbalances for centuries in a wide variety of contexts.
II.

WHY DATA LOYALTY?

One common question that proposals for a duty of data loyalty
often face is, “What does a duty of loyalty get you that other approaches
to regulation do not?” This is an excellent question that asks why a
duty of loyalty might be the right regulatory tool rather than some
other approach. We believe that duties of data loyalty offer four
important advantages that other approaches do not.
First, loyalty represents a central policy commitment that could be
the missing ingredient to embolden existing U.S. privacy frameworks.
Second, it is substantially more capable than a traditional data
protection approach when it comes to modern privacy problems like
algorithmic discrimination, manipulation, oppression, and shaming
that are caused by unceasing digital contact and the astonishing scale
and power of modern technology platforms. Third, loyalty helps solve
privacy law’s harm problem in a way that is consistent with the
direction of current Supreme Court doctrine. Finally, data loyalty has
a straightforward and strong rhetorical appeal; it offers a clear
explanation for better privacy rules, it could help define America’s
privacy identity, and it could be used to gather broad popular support
for stronger privacy rules.
A. To Embolden Existing Data Privacy Frameworks
Law professor Ryan Calo is fond of saying that technology law’s
biggest problem is that we lack the political will to enforce the rules we
already have.21 We believe that this problem persists in privacy law as

21 See, e.g., Ryan Calo, Artificial Intelligence and the Carousel of Soft Law, 2 IEEE
TRANSACTIONS ON TECH. & SOC’Y 171, 171 (2021) (“But ultimately what is missing is not
knowledge about the content of ethics as much as political will.”); Enlisting Big Data in the
Fight Against Coronavirus: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Com., Sci., & Transp., 116th Cong.
(2020) (statement of Ryan Calo, Law Professor, University of Washington) (“It is also
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well. Many privacy regulators lack the same political will and support
from lawmakers and the executive branch to enforce existing data
rules in a robust way. Many privacy rules are also vague, leaving their
interpretation (and enforcement based upon that interpretation) up
in the air. For example, what constitutes an “unfair trade practice,” a
“reasonable expectation of privacy,” or the collection of “more data
than is necessary” is a perennial topic of debate.
One of the reasons why U.S. data privacy frameworks tend to wilt
is that they lack a clear touchstone to guide interpretation that would
lead to effective enforcement. The collection of U.S. privacy statutes,
enforcement actions, and common law remedies adhere to basic
commitments like “do not lie,” “do not harm,” and “follow the Fair
Information Practices (FIPS).”22 But such edicts tend not to
interrogate the wrongful motives of data processors and do little to
force companies into any practice beyond bare compliance.
A duty of loyalty could change that. Lawmakers should use loyalty
duties to embolden and revitalize existing approaches to regulating
data privacy, such as robust implementation of data minimization
requirements, rules against unfair and deceptive trade practices, and
expansion of products liability theories of accountability. Data loyalty
can empower lawmakers to use tools that have already been developed,
by expanding the contexts in which rules should be followed, who must
follow them, and the level of adherence necessary for compliance.
Take as an example data minimization, the idea that organizations
should only collect, maintain, and use data that is necessary to fulfill a
designated and legitimate purpose. Data minimization rules are a
fundamental commitment of data protection and data security laws.
They are scattered throughout U.S. law, including the California
Consumer Privacy Act,23 the Wiretap Act,24 and are implicitly a part of
important to note that a lack of political will is sometimes the greater hurdle than a lack of
information.”).
22 See, e.g., WOODROW HARTZOG, PRIVACY’S BLUEPRINT: THE BATTLE TO CONTROL THE
DESIGN OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES 15 (2018); Hartzog & Richards, Privacy’s Constitutional
Moment, supra note 5, at 1704 & n.66; Richards & Hartzog, Duty of Loyalty, supra note 3, at
42.
23 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100(c) (2018) (“A business’ collection, use, retention, and
sharing of a consumer’s personal information shall be reasonably necessary and
proportionate to achieve the purposes for which the personal information was collected or
processed, or for another disclosed purpose that is compatible with the context in which
the personal information was collected, and not processed in a manner that is incompatible
with those purposes.”).
24 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (2018) (“No order entered under this section may authorize
or approve the interception of any wire, oral, or electronic communication for any period
longer than is necessary to achieve the objective of the authorization, nor in any event
longer than thirty days. . . . Every order and extension thereof shall contain a provision that
the authorization to intercept shall be executed as soon as practicable, shall be conducted
in such a way as to minimize the interception of communications not otherwise subject to
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the data security requirements of Section 5 of the FTC Act.25 Data
minimization, if robustly interpreted and enforced as a way for
companies to remain loyal to trusting parties, could be a remarkably
effective tool for regulators since it targets both collection and use of
data and is meant to counter abusive purpose creep by companies.26 If
data loyalty became a guiding obligation for data minimization rules,
it would give regulators and judges interpreting potential violations an
additional layer of interrogation. Data loyalty would compel an
examination of a company’s motives and the potential adverse
consequences to consumers in determining if more data than
necessary was collected or if the use of data deviated too far from its
original purpose. Such foundational support would prevent an arid
and strictly textual analysis by explicitly forcing regulators and judges
to look at the big picture of exploitative motives of organizations and
the trusting parties’ wellbeing.
Another example would be laws based on the Fair Information
Practices, the most common standard for privacy laws worldwide.
Under current U.S. privacy law, perhaps the most important question
for regulators and compliance professionals is whether consumers
have been given “notice and choice.” In principle, this is a good thing,
emphasizing consent to data practices and evoking the gold standard
of “knowing and voluntary” consent familiar to lawyers and medical
researchers. But in practice, under current American law, “notice and
choice” all too often means just that consumers have merely vague
“notice” of data practices that are buried in the fine print and illusory
“choice” with respect to these practices such as a take-it-or-leave-it
choice about whether to use the service.
In practice, such rules not only place few constraints on
companies, but they also represent a kind of cookbook to create and
justify even deeply disloyal data practices by checking the boxes of
fictional notice and illusory consent. This is likely why companies like
Amazon have been engaged in aggressive lobbying in many state
capitols to get weak notice-and-choice (and only weak notice-and-

interception under this chapter, and must terminate upon attainment of the authorized
objective, or in any event in thirty days.”).
25 See FTC, COMMISSION STATEMENT MARKING THE FTC’S 50TH DATA SECURITY
SETTLEMENT (2014) (“The Commission has also provided educational materials to industry
and the public about reasonable data security practices. These materials explain that, while
there is no single solution, such a program follows certain basic principles. . . . [Among
them,] companies should limit the information they collect and retain based on their
legitimate business needs so that needless storage of data does not create unnecessary risks
of unauthorized access to the data.”).
26 See, e.g., DANIEL SOLOVE & WOODROW HARTZOG, BREACHED! WHY DATA SECURITY
LAW FAILS AND HOW TO IMPROVE IT (forthcoming 2022).
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choice) laws on the books.27 But here, too, a duty of loyalty could help.
If data loyalty became a guiding obligation for data processing, noticeand-choice requirements would become more than a checkbox
compliance exercise at best and a cookbook for manipulation at worst.
Instead, “notice” would become an obligation of honesty, ensuring
that consumers actually understood what was happening with their
data before they agreed to it, and preventing companies from all sorts
of self-interested practices where meaningful understanding was not
present. “Choice” would mean knowing and voluntary agreement to
particular data practices among reasonable alternatives that do not
conflict with a trusting party’s best interests, rather than a “choice”
about whether to live in the modern world or not.
In these ways, by reorienting the question for companies from
“What can we get away with” to “Are we being loyal to our human
customers,” a duty of data loyalty could breathe new life into existing
regimes that are moribund at best and exploitation-enabling at their
worst.
B. To Address Emergent Dangers
A second benefit of data loyalty is that it can safeguard consumers
against novel and emerging digital risks. Data loyalty duties can go
beyond the standard data processing concerns and traditional privacy
harms. In crafting such rules, lawmakers should look to the ways in
which the affordances of modern technologies endanger people by
bestowing power in trusted entities. Data loyalty duties should
scrutinize how those organizations have incentives to use the power
human information gives them in self-interested ways that conflict with
a trusting party’s best interests. Duties crafted in this way would
meaningfully respond to concerns about manipulative user interfaces
(sometimes called “dark patterns”), the wrongful extraction of human
labor by dominant platforms, algorithmic discrimination, and
protection against third parties and other users while using a service.
Duties of data loyalty can thus go beyond often hard-to-quantify
injuries of individual pieces of data and address the structural power
imbalances and inequalities that characterize the relationships
between individual harried consumers and the richest corporations in
the history of the world.

27 See Jeffrey Dastin, Chris Kirkham & Aditya Kalra, Amazon Wages Secret War on
Americans’ Privacy, Documents Show, REUTERS (Nov. 19, 2021), https://www.reuters.com
/investigates/special-report/amazon-privacy-lobbying/ [https://perma.cc/LE8N-PBCM].
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C. To Solve Privacy’s Harm Problem
Third, and related to the problem of emergent dangers, a duty of
data loyalty would help lawmakers solve one of privacy law’s most
difficult problems: the problem of cognizable harm. Many privacy
rules require some kind of economic, physical, emotional, or other
kind of concrete and traditionally recognized harm to be legally
cognizable. However, loyalty rules look to the trusted party’s
inequitable conduct of wrongfully exploiting an advantage gained by
an information relationship. The exploitation of the relationship
against a trusting party’s interests can itself be the wrong, such as in a
case of conflict of interest, even if no other tangible harm manifests.28
In privacy cases, this is significant because American plaintiffs in
privacy and data breach lawsuits have struggled to articulate diffuse but
real informational injuries, and this situation has been made worse in
recent years as courts have tightened the rules for what counts as a
legally cognizable injury under Article III standing doctrine.29
Critically, loyalty duties do not have this problem—not just because the
legal injury in loyalty cases is the disloyalty itself, but because this injury
is one that has been already recognized by courts as legally sufficient
within standing doctrine.30
The focus of loyalty is on the integrity of a relationship and
removing an incentive and ability to wrongfully profit by taking
advantage of a power disparity. Because loyalty duties are rooted in
betrayal rather than harm or injury, they have significant consumer

28 See TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW 107–08 (2011) (“The duty of loyalty supports
the main purpose of fiduciary law: to prohibit fiduciaries from misappropriating or
misusing entrusted property or power. Thus, the duty of loyalty is manifested by important
preventative rules. Such rules prohibit actions even though they are not necessarily
injurious to entrustors.”).
29 See, e.g., TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2214 (2021); Spokeo, Inc. v.
Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 342 (2016).
30 To get a bit technical for a moment, in TransUnion/Spokeo terms, then, a breach of
a legally imposed duty of loyalty would be a “concrete” and “traditionally recognized”
intangible harm. To satisfy this requirement, Spokeo requires courts “to consider whether
an alleged intangible harm has a close relationship to a harm that has traditionally been
regarded as providing a basis for a lawsuit in English or American courts.” Spokeo, 578 U.S.
at 341. Ramirez uses a slightly different formulation—asking whether an intangible injury
bears “a close relationship to harms traditionally recognized as providing a basis for lawsuits
in American courts.” Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. at 2204. But because a breach of a duty of loyalty
has been recognized as a basis for lawsuits for centuries, duties of loyalty simply do not raise
concreteness problems. See also Citron & Solove, supra note 20. By contrast, although duties
of care in general would be concrete, statutory causes of action rooted in novel theories of
harm (including procedural data protection requirements) would seem to have to run
through the Spokeo test, with an uncertain likelihood of success.
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protection advantages over existing privacy rules that demand proof of
injury.31
D. To Define America’s Privacy Identity
Finally, a duty of data loyalty could offer a defining value for
America’s privacy law identity, rather than forcing it to adopt a
watered-down and sometimes ill-fitting version of the European GDPR
approach. While American privacy law is weak, permissive, and
seemingly rudderless, in Europe, privacy law is on firmer ground.
Privacy and data protection are both considered fundamental human
rights in the EU.32 The GDPR is the manifestation of these rights, a
commitment to the idea that people should be able to determine their
informational fates for themselves. Bilyana Petkova has argued that
data protection is “the main tenet of constitutional identity” in the
EU.33 This is why European data protection law often seems so
strikingly powerful to American observers compared to domestic
consumer privacy rights. As much as anything, then, for Europeans
the GDPR is a state of mind. And it is why a U.S. version of the GDPR
would inevitably be both a weak and inadequate version of the real
GDPR, something we have elsewhere called a “GDPR-lite.”34
A duty of loyalty could fill this definitional role for U.S. privacy
law. It could supply a political lodestar for privacy reform that defines
America’s privacy identity on its own terms rather than those of the
EU.
Lawmakers should not underestimate loyalty’s rhetorical
potential. A rallying cry requiring companies to “act in our best
interests” could motivate American privacy reform in the way that “the
right to be let alone” did at the turn of the twentieth century.
Technocratic terms like “data minimization” and “legitimate interests
of the data controller” do little for public imagination or
comprehension. By contrast, loyalty is clear, it is easy to understand,
and it is potentially robust enough to counterbalance spurious industry
claims about the importance of “innovation” or the idea that
commercial data processing carries First Amendment value. GDPRstyle ideas like requiring companies to undergo data protection impact
assessments can feel wonky and feeble, but every person in America
likely knows how it feels to be betrayed.
31 See, e.g., H.R. 117, 192d Gen. Ct., §2(a) (Mass. 2021) (“A covered entity shall be
prohibited from taking any actions with respect to processing facial recognition data or
designing facial recognition technologies that conflict with an end user’s best interests.”).
32 See, e.g., U.N. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221; Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union arts. 7–8, 2000 O.J. (C 364).
33 Bilyana Petkova, Privacy as Europe’s First Amendment, 25 EUR. L.J. 140, 154 (2019).
34 For an extended version of an argument along these lines, see Hartzog & Richards,
Privacy’s Constitutional Moment, supra note 5, at 1727–32.
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If companies owe us duties of loyalty, then “innovative” uses of
data to exploit us start to resemble betrayal and fraud, and claims of
First Amendment protection for manipulative uses of data look
appropriately laughable. Loyalty also has the virtue of placing the
obligation for ethical data processing right where it belongs, ensuring
those to whom we expose our data vulnerabilities do not betray us. A
duty of loyalty in privacy law would be important not just as a set of
rules, but as an idea capable of rallying democratic support for strong
rules.
Finally, loyalty can be good for business. At a U.S. Senate hearing
in 2020, Senator Brian Schatz expressed the idea that duties of loyalty
are only needed for bad businesses, because good businesses know that
the best way to make money over the long term is to be loyal to their
customers.35 On the other hand, if disloyalty is permitted by the law,
the pressures on business to show quarterly profits create strong shortterm and short-sighted incentives to cheat and behave in disloyal ways.
This in many respects is the story of the contemporary digital economy,
a story that data loyalty offers the potential to change for the better.
III.

A MODEL FOR LEGISLATING DATA LOYALTY

One undeniable virtue of creating a duty of data loyalty is that it
would not be necessary to invent it from whole cloth. Loyalty duties
have a long and established pedigree in our law, most famously in the
law of fiduciaries. A duty of data loyalty could draw heavily from this
tradition and its proven ability to protect against the power imbalances
in relationships in a fair, principled, and meaningful way.
Fiduciary law scholars have identified a two-step process
lawmakers use to implement loyalty obligations in such a fair and just
way.36 Lawmakers initially articulate a primary, general duty of loyalty.
Next, courts and lawmakers go about the task of creating and refining
what have been referred to as “subsidiary” duties that are more specific
and sensitive to context. These subsidiary duties target the most
opportunistic contexts for self-dealing and typically result in a mix of
overlapping open-ended rules, maxims, more specific standards, and
highly specific rules.

35 See Revisiting the Need for Federal Data Privacy Legislation: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on Com., Sci., & Transp., 116th Cong. (2020) (statement of Sen. Brian Schatz).
36 See, e.g., Robert H. Sitkoff, Other Fiduciary Duties: Implementing Loyalty and Care, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW 419 (Evan J. Criddle, Paul B. Miller & Robert
H. Sitkoff eds., 2019) (“The duties of loyalty and care, which we might call the primary
fiduciary duties, are typically structured as broad, open-ended standards that speak
generally. . . . By contrast, the other fiduciary duties, which we might call the subsidiary or
implementing fiduciary duties, are typically structured as rules or at least as more specific
standards that speak with greater specificity.”).
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Thus, we propose that a duty of data loyalty should be
implemented on two levels. The first level is a broad and general
prohibition on substantial conflicts with the trusting party’s best
interests. This would prevent the most egregious forms of disloyalty
across the board, and it would also serve to orient the company’s
incentives generally against betrayal rather than micromanaging
specific instances. The second level of a duty of loyalty would be more
specific and, where necessary, restrictive. This would involve the
articulation of specific and substantive subsidiary duties targeting
particular contexts and actions that provide clear rules and less wiggle
room to ensure accountability and keep the frameworks from
becoming watered down. Though this two-step approach, a duty of
data loyalty could provide both general applicability as well as
sensitivity to individual contexts.
A. First, a General Catchall Duty
We propose a general rule of data loyalty as follows:
Organizations shall not process data or design systems and tools in ways that
significantly conflict with trusting parties’ best interests that are implicated by
their exposure.
Let’s break this proposed duty down a little.
1. A No-Conflict Rule for Data and Design
Organizations gain a power advantage over trusting parties in two
different ways: collecting and processing data and controlling our
mediated experiences.37 If the duty of loyalty is to accomplish
anything, it should prohibit the conflicted design of digital tools and
data processing. Avoiding conflicts is loyalty’s core mandate and the
logical starting point for lawmakers, judges, industry, and civil society.
A general rule against conflicted design and data processing could
serve as the foundation for a host of regulatory regimes, self-regulatory
efforts, and guidance to the public to encourage and nurture its trust.
A general no-conflict rule has the remarkable advantage of
directing lawmakers (and trusted parties themselves) to interrogate
not just actions but motives and gains.38 Established fiduciary noconflict rules

37 See, e.g., RICHARDS, supra note 13; HARTZOG, supra note 22.
38 See Paul B. Miller & Andrew S. Gold, Fiduciary Governance, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV.
513, 557–58 (2015) (quoting Lionel Smith, The Motive, Not the Deed, in RATIONALIZING
PROPERTY, EQUITY AND TRUSTS: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF EDWARD BURN 53, 67 (Joshua Getzler
ed., 2003) (“[T]he motives of the fiduciary are the crucial element in determining whether
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do not require the fiduciary to act in any particular way but are instead
thought to establish boundaries within which the fiduciary may reasonably
be expected to act loyally, at least to the extent that the rules isolate biasing
factors that might induce the fiduciary to subjugate the interests of
beneficiaries to the interests of others.39

2. People Over Profits
Some lawmakers are reluctant to adopt duties of data loyalty
because they fear creating a conflict with the duties of loyalty that
directors of organizations owe to shareholders.40 This is an illusory
conflict and, at most, is resolvable by lawmakers without substantially
remaking corporate law.41 The supposed conflict between trusting
parties and shareholders has been wildly overstated.42 Fiduciary law
scholar Andrew Tuch explains that “imposing user-regarding

the fiduciary has acted loyally, and the requirement of motive is quite specific—the fiduciary
‘must act (or not act) in what he perceives to be the best interests of the beneficiary.’”)).
39 Id. at 557.
40 One of the most repeated critiques levied against the idea of imposing duties of
data loyalty on companies is Lina Khan and David Pozen’s claim that relational rules might
create conflicting loyalties. The authors assert that “[t]he tension between what it would
take to implement a fiduciary duty of loyalty to users, on the one hand, and these
companies’ economic incentives and duties to shareholders, on the other, is too deep to
resolve without fundamental reform.” Khan & Pozen, supra note 3, at 529, 534 (“[T]he
information-fiduciary proposal could cure at most a small fraction of the problems
associated with online platforms—and to the extent it does, only by undercutting directors’
duties to shareholders, undermining foundational principles of fiduciary law, or both.”).
41 See, e.g., Balkin, The Fiduciary Model, supra note 3, at 23 (“Management’s fiduciary
obligations to shareholders assume that the corporation will attempt to comply with the legal
duties owed to those affected by the corporation’s business practices, even if this reduces
shareholder value.”).
42 See Andrew F. Tuch, A General Defense of Information Fiduciaries, 98 WASH. U. L. REV.
1897, 1902 (2021) (arguing that Khan and Pozen “significantly overstate the threat that
corporate and fiduciary law poses for the information fiduciary model.”). Tuch argues that
corporate law only imposes duties on directors, not corporations, and the information
fiduciaries proposal imposes duties on corporations, not directors. See id. at 1909. Relational
duties would not create a set of inconsistent obligations among a single fiduciary. See id. at
1910. The issue of parallel fiduciary obligations owed by corporations as a whole to clients
and directors to shareholders is routine. See id. Not only is the “likelihood of fiduciary
breach that Khan and Pozen point to in claiming tension between Balkin’s proposal and
corporate law . . . theoretically remote,” it is “in practical terms, nonexistent.” Id. at 1915.
Additionally, if lawmakers obligate a duty of loyalty, then directors are bound to privilege it
over shareholder interests. See id. at 1916–17 (“Delaware law altogether avoids tension with
regimes such as Balkin’s. Delaware corporate law requires directors to exercise their
discretion within legal limits imposed on the corporation; it does not license or excuse noncompliance with corporate obligations, even if directors believe that doing so would
maximize shareholder value. And Delaware law offers no suggestion that a corporation’s
duties or responsibilities should be diluted or otherwise shaped by the content of directors’
duties. Instead, case law indicates that directors must act ‘within the law.’” (footnotes
omitted)).
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obligations on corporations will not create untenable frictions between
duties to users and duties to shareholders. . . . [T]he primary
criticism—that Delaware corporate law undermines the information
fiduciary regime—should be dismissed.”43
If lawmakers were to adopt data loyalty rules, then corporate law
would in fact demand that directors adhere to them first and
foremost.44 In other words, the loyalty that directors owe to
shareholders takes a backseat to legal obligations placed upon the
corporation, including duties of loyalty to customers.45 In fact, if a duty
of data loyalty owed by platforms to people is made positive law, a
director that acts with the intent to act in conflict with users’ best
interests or fails to act in the face of a known loyalty obligation may be
liable for breach to shareholders of their fiduciary obligation as well as
their duty to users.46
If data loyalty is going to work, then trusting parties must be
prioritized over other loyalties owed by organizations, such as loyalty
duties owed by firms to shareholders. Prioritizing trusting parties over
shareholders would resolve any lingering “divided loyalty” concerns,
as well as conflicting loyalties between users and third-party vendors.
Self-interested actions would be allowed, but only if they didn’t conflict
with trusting parties’ best interests regarding their data and mediated
experiences. And of course, it is an elementary principle of U.S.

43 Id. at 1902 (“The criticism rests on a partial understanding of corporate law
doctrine and theory. The criticism sees conflicting obligations where none exist and
identifies strategies for resolving these apparent conflicts that are unknown to corporate
law. . . . I also argue that Khan and Pozen’s arguments are not merely mistaken but, if
accepted, may do harm. Applying their case to financial conglomerates—more apt
analogues for social media companies than the ‘[d]octors, lawyers, accountants, and the
like’ to whom scholars often draw their comparison—shows that Khan and Pozen’s
arguments, if accepted, would have pernicious effects on broad spheres of corporate
regulation.” (quoting Khan & Pozen, supra note 3, at 506)).
44 Tuch argues that “[u]nder the information fiduciary model, corporate law would
require compliance with user-regarding obligations, creating incentives for directors to
favor users’ interests over those of shareholders.” Id.
45 Id. at 1917–18 (“Reflecting corporate law’s attitude toward legal compliance,
former Harvard Law Dean Robert Clark identifies the corporation’s purpose as to
‘maximize the value of the company’s shares, subject to the constraint that the corporation
must meet all its legal obligations to others who are related to or affected by it.’ . . . Even
the most ardent advocates of shareholder primacy have not suggested that corporate law
requires, or should require, corporations or directors to maximize shareholder value in
violation of a corporation’s legal obligations.” (quoting ROBERT CHARLES CLARK,
CORPORATE LAW 17–18 (1986))).
46 See id. at 1918–19 (citing In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 67
(Del. 2006); see also Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369–70 (Del. 2006) (“The failure to act
in good faith may result in liability [for directors] because the requirement to act in good
faith ‘is a subsidiary element[,]’ i.e., a condition, ‘of the fundamental duty of loyalty.’”)
(citing Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n.34 (Del. Ch. 2003)).
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constitutional law that a federal duty of loyalty would take precedence
over any state duties by operation of the Supremacy Clause.
Data loyalty would still allow companies to profit and flourish.
The “best interests” polestar of loyalty, by design, accommodates all
kinds of self-serving behavior. It simply makes self-serving behavior
allowable only in instances where it aligns with the best interests of the
primary trusting party.47
3. The Collective Best Interests of Trusting Parties
There are a few different ways to deal with inevitable conflicts
between trusting parties as well. The first would be to impose a
reasonableness and fairness approach, or a duty of impartiality
between people who expose themselves to organizations.48 In trying to
accommodate the best interests of billions of individuals, whose “best
interests” might differ from person to person, lawmakers could also
follow tort law’s move to a more objective standard: the reasonable
user. Not only would a reasonable user standard help companies
better determine the scope of their duties, but it would also inject a
normative element into the analysis.
Our proposal adopts a collective approach to “best interests,” to
better avoid conflicts between trusting parties and help free privacy law
from its overly individualistic focus.
Allowing lawmakers and
regulators to focus on the collective best interests of “trusting parties,”
they can better respond to systemic harms detected sporadically by
individuals but strongly at the group level. We recommend that
lawmakers specifically prioritize interests that are held collectively by
groups of users, with certain individually held interests holding sway
only to the extent they do not conflict with collective user interests.49
A more collective best interests approach would be an
improvement over the individual self-determination model, which
does not compel people to consider the common good or threats to
47 See John H. Langbein, Questioning the Trust Law Duty of Loyalty: Sole Interest or Best
Interest?, 114 YALE L.J. 929, 932 (2005) (“[A] transaction prudently undertaken to advance
the best interest of the beneficiaries best serves the purpose of the duty of loyalty, even if
the trustee also does or might derive some benefit. A transaction in which there has been
conflict or overlap of interest should be sustained if the trustee can prove that the
transaction was prudently undertaken in the best interest of the beneficiaries.”).
48 Andrew S. Gold, The Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 36, at 398 (“[C]onflicts among best interests obligations [owed
to multiple beneficiaries] are unavoidable. Where such conflicts exist, one answer is to find
that loyalty must manifest itself as fairness and reasonableness. Another answer is to impose
a duty of impartiality,” which would demand “due regard” (though not necessarily
equality). (footnotes omitted)).
49 Id. (discussing the hierarchy of obligations approach to how “common shares
might ordinarily benefit from fiduciary obligations while preferred shares will only benefit
in exceptional [circumstances]”).
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groups they are not a part of. When people give consent to data
practices, they usually aren’t motivated to reflect upon how their
decision will affect vulnerable groups that they are not a part of.50 This
is similar to some people’s indifference to public health when they
“choose” not to wear a mask during a pandemic.
A reasonable user approach would also be consistent with the
parallel duty of care and sensitive to the fact that tech companies deal
in bulk and batched relationships. A reasonableness, context-sensitive
approach would require loyalty obligations that are proportional to
risk of abuse. The duty would be the most robust where the volume of
data collected is highest and organization’s power over people is the
greatest. Because this duty of loyalty would be new and novel for
privacy law and would need to be tailored to the unique characteristics
of modern information relationships, lawmakers have the ability to
craft a unique and fitting approach that borrows from how duties of
loyalty operate in other contexts without being bound by it.
4. Limited to Trusting Parties’ Exposure
In our previous work on trust, we defined the concept of trust as
the willingness to make oneself vulnerable to the actions of others.51
Our proposed general duty of loyalty would be limited to the extent of
that vulnerability. Specifically, the “best interests” should be limited
to the interests affected by the entrustment of data, labor, and
attention, instead of an overall well-being standard. Organizations
would be directed to ask what interests were implicated by the
affordances of the data and design of user interfaces. So while it might
be disloyal for a company to design a system that leveraged trusting
parties’ geolocation to allow pharmaceutical companies to target
people when they are currently in the hospital (and thus vulnerable),
it would probably not be disloyal for that company to generally allow
pharmaceutical companies to place advertisements on their app or
website. Systems that allow for such microtargeted advertising based
on highly detailed profiles rather than isolated contexts make
exploitation of vulnerable parties easier and compound incentives for
companies to engineer exposure for financial gains.52
In conjunction with a duty of care, a duty of loyalty animates a
number of different broad subsidiary duties, such as duties of candor,

50 See, e.g., Richards & Hartzog, Pathologies of Digital Consent, supra note 5, at 1498;
Evan Selinger & Woodrow Hartzog, The Inconsentability of Facial Surveillance, 66 LOY. L. REV.
33, 44 (2020).
51 Richards & Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously, supra note 5, at 448.
52 See, e.g., JOSEPH JEROME & ARIEL FOX JOHNSON, ADTECH AND KIDS: BEHAVIORAL
ADS NEED A TIME OUT (2021).
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good faith, nondelegation of key services, and confidentiality.53 But
legislatures and courts often go further and create or delegate
authority for the creation of a series of clearer subsidiary obligations
that are more like rules than vague standards.54
This two-tiered approach allows lawmakers to tailor rules to
specific relationships to avoid specific foreseeable conduct while
maintaining flexibility for new and changed rules in the future.55 As
applied to privacy law, it would allow lawmakers to target large
platforms or social media companies that presented specific problems
of gatekeeping for third parties or self-dealing due to two-way markets
without applying the same specific rules to traditional e-commerce or
media streaming companies bound by a general duty of loyalty.
Companies not bound by specific subsidiary rules would still be bound
by a general duty of loyalty.
B. Second, Rules for Subsidiary Implementing Duties
Lawmakers can create specific subsidiary rules to help resolve
objections that a duty of data loyalty is just too vague.56 Enacting
53 See Whitt, supra note 3, at 94–95 (“Additional fiduciary obligations recognized by
courts of equity over many centuries include the duty of candor, duty of good faith, duty
not to delegate the services to others, and the duty of confidentiality. Typically they are
subsumed as ‘subsidiary’ or ‘implementing’ obligations under either the duty of care or of
loyalty. However, in some legal quarters the duty of confidentiality has been deemed an
important supportive component of the ‘primary’ fiduciary duties. . . . [T]he duty of
confidentiality deserves special status in the digital environment as an ‘enabling’ obligation
that strengthens the more well-established fiduciary duties of care and of loyalty.”
(footnotes omitted)).
54 Robert Sitkoff explains that
[t]he duties of loyalty and care, which we might call the primary fiduciary duties,
are typically structured as broad, open-ended standards that speak generally. . . .
By contrast, the other fiduciary duties, which we might call the subsidiary or
implementing fiduciary duties, are typically structured as rules or at least as more
specific standards that speak with greater specificity.
Robert H. Sitkoff, Other Fiduciary Duties: Implementing Loyalty and Care, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 36, at 419.
55 Sitkoff gives the prudent investor rule as an example of a how subsidiary rules
develop in trust law. Id. at 421 (“Structurally the prudent investor rule is an elaborated
standard that, by focusing on risk-and-return and diversification, gives specific content to
the open-ended, primary duty of care, called prudence in trust parlance, as applied to the
investment function of trusteeship . . . . [W]ithin the fiduciary fields that do include an
investment function, the prudent investor rule encompasses the accumulated learning on
what the duty of care requires in fiduciary investment. In consequence, rather than start
from scratch in every fiduciary investment matter, fiduciaries, beneficiaries, and courts may
look to the elaboration within the prudent investor rule to discern the application of the
duty of care.”).
56 In a hearing on the future of transatlantic data flows called by the U.S. Senate
Committee on Commerce, Science, & Transportation, Senator Wicker asked of a panelist
who advocated for a duty of loyalty in privacy law, “[w]here is there a working duty of loyalty
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legislation should also either provide for subsidiary duties or delegate
rulemaking authority for future subsidiary rules. These subsidiary data
loyalty rules might take a page from and model information privacy
versions of nonprivacy fiduciary duties such as disclosure, consent,
accounting for property (access and portability rights), confidentiality,
and the full suite of fair information practice principles. This would
apply some of the most significant obligations compelled by the GDPR.
A duty of loyalty, combined with a duty of care, could spur on specific
rulemaking for concepts like data minimization and legitimate basis
requirements that would be bound together by an antibetrayal ethos.
But lawmakers need not stop there. One of the most important
subsidiary duties to stem opportunistic behavior would be a robust
prohibition on abusive trade practices. As we detailed in prior work,
companies leveraging people’s own cognitive and resource limitations
against them to wrongfully extract data and labor is an endemic
problem online.
Subsidiary rules prohibiting abusive trade practices would
prohibit entrustees from materially interfering with the ability of
trusting parties to understand the terms of the relationship and the
risk associated with exposure and engagement.57 Rules against abuse
would also prohibit entrustees from taking unreasonable advantage of
trusting parties’ lack of understanding about the material risks, costs,
or conditions of the entrustees’ service or the inability of trusting
in place in law somewhere that we can look to? When we’re able to be specific in those
instances, then we’re getting somewhere. But beyond that, it’s hard actually to define [a
duty of loyalty].” The Invalidation of the EU-US Privacy Shield and the Future of Transatlantic
Data Flows: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Com., Sci., & Transp., 116th Cong. (2020)
(statement of Sen. Roger Wicker, Chairman, S. Comm. on Com., Sci., & Transp.). Senator
Wicker is the sponsor of one of the most prominent proposals for an omnibus federal
privacy law in the United States. The Senator actually expressed tentative support for a duty
of loyalty, even though such a duty does not explicitly appear in the bill he sponsored. And
in full disclosure, the panelist was one of the authors of this Essay. Also, thank you for
reading so deeply in our paper—and in its footnotes. See also James Grimmelmann, When
All You Have Is a Fiduciary, LAW & POL. ECON. PROJECT (May 30, 2019),
https://lpeproject.org/blog/when-all-you-have-is-a-fiduciary
[https://perma.cc/V5PB4D6B] (arguing that when applied to digital platforms “the rule against self-dealing is either
absurdly under-inclusive, absurdly over-inclusive, or both”).
57 We propose that lawmakers adapt language from the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau’s authority to regulate abusive trade practices along these lines: “Abusive
trade practice” means any conduct by a covered entity that 1) materially interferes with the
ability of a trusting party to understand a term or condition of the agreement between
covered entities and trusting party relating to the processing of personal data or effect or
functionality of a system, tool, or user interface deployed by the covered entity; or 2) takes
unreasonable advantage of: a) a lack of understanding on the part of the trusting party of
the material risks, costs, or conditions of the covered entity’s product or service; or b) the
inability of the trusting parties to protect their interests in selecting or using a covered
entity’s product or service; or c) the reasonable reliance by the trusting party on a covered
entity’s representation to act in the interests of the trusting party.
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parties to protect their interests within the relationship. Finally, antiabuse rules would prohibit entrustees from taking unreasonable
advantage of the reasonable reliance by trusting parties on entrustees’
representations to act in the trusting parties’ interests.
Lawmakers might also consider rigid prohibitions on specific
practices like the deployment of unreasonably dangerous automated
tools or the use of personal data to train those automated systems.
They could create subsidiary rules for inherently dangerous practices
and technologies that, at the systemic level, are in fundamental conflict
with the best interests of trusting parties, such as microtargeting, a
practice that paves the path for third party abuse and imposes more
externalities than benefits for trusting parties; and affect recognition,
a fundamentally misguided, mistaken, and oppressive tool.58
Lawmakers could craft even more rules designed for specific parties
such as “social media platforms may not deploy affect recognition
technologies on photos or videos submitted by trusting parties.” There
might also be disclosure mandates, process requirements, prohibitions
on conduct, or obligated tasks. Each rule should target specific areas
where trusted parties have an incentive to engage in self-dealing.59
Lawmakers could, of course, impose all these rules even without
couching them within an umbrella duty of loyalty. We have proposed
in previous research that trust-building and trust-enforcing rules
irrespective of a relationship between the parties could be meaningful
complements or the next best thing to broad and strong relational
obligations.60 Many of these rules, such as data protection obligations,
should have sibling rules that apply regardless of whether data
controllers are in an information relationship with a trusting party.
But we believe that a duty of loyalty would act as an important
animating force, interpretive guide, and catchall provision that would
bring more coherence, flexibility, and accountability through
enforcement than these rules would have as stand-alone laws.
Nonetheless, we propose specific subsidiary rules within
information relationships to maximize the advantages of a relational
approach to privacy. Scholars and lawmakers have identified different
contexts where the incentives for self-dealing by the powerful party in

58 For an exploration on the dangers of affect recognition systems see, e.g., KATE
CRAWFORD, ATLAS OF AI (2021); Kate Crawford, Artificial Intelligence Is Misreading Human
Emotion, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 27, 2021), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive
/2021/04/artificial-intelligence-misreading-human-emotion/618696/
[https://perma.cc/T6AV-J25T]; LUKE STARK & JESSE HOEY, THE ETHICS OF EMOTION IN
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS (2021).
59 See Andrew S. Gold, The Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 36, at 401 (“Different opportunism risks will then justify
different loyalty content and approaches to legal decision-making.”).
60 See Richards & Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously, supra note 5.
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an information relationship are overwhelming, making these contexts
ripe for subsidiary data loyalty rules.61 We synthesize these contexts
into five main areas: Entrustees should be loyal when collecting
information, being sure to collect only information for purposes that
do not conflict with a trusting party’s best interests. Entrusees should
be loyal when personalizing, i.e., treating people differently based upon
personal information or characteristics. Entrustees should be loyal
gatekeepers, avoiding conflicts when allowing government and other
third-party access to trusting parties and their data. Entrustees should
be loyal when trying to influence trusting parties, such as when they
leverage personal data and digital tools to exert sway over people to
achieve particular results. Finally, entrustees should be loyal in the
ways they mediate interactions between users of their platform,
specifically in the creation and administration of systems that govern
how people are allowed to interact with each other. These contexts
often overlap and involve issues like discriminatory microtargeting,
harmful amplification of misinformation, failure of process for content
moderation, and abusive dark patterns. We propose that lawmakers
create subsidiary loyalty rules and standards to mitigate these kinds of
disloyal behaviors.
1. Loyal Collection
A duty of loyalty should attach the moment a trusted party invites
disclosure and makes the decision to collect personal information. In
this way, data loyalty could embolden the fair information principle of
data minimization. This principle holds that data collectors should
only identify the minimum amount of personal information needed to
fulfill a legitimate purpose and collection and hold that much
information and no more.62 Combined with the storage limitation
principle, which holds that organizations should not keep data longer
than they need it for their stated purpose, data minimization is a
central pillar in data protection regimes around the world, but it too
often fails to find traction.63

61 See, e.g., Balkin, The Fiduciary Model, supra note 3; Scholz, supra note 3, at 197;
Dobkin, supra note 3, at 17 (identifying four major ways of breaching an information
fiduciary duty: “manipulation, discrimination, third-party sharing, and violating a
company’s own privacy policy”); Barrett, supra note 3, at 1100 (“[A]n information fiduciary
framework should also address manipulation and discrimination in order to ensure that
people are protected from the full array of modern digital threats that they face.”).
62 See Principle (c): Data Minimisation, INFO. COMM’RS OFF., https://ico.org.uk/fororganisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-regulation-gd
pr/principles/data-minimisation/#data_minimisation [https://perma.cc/6TTU-BJ8H].
63 See id.; Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 5(e) 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 (EU) (providing
the GDPR’s storage limitation principle).
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Data loyalty could provide a normative vision for when companies
have exceeded their duty to minimize collection and retention—when
it conflicts with a trusting party’s (or collective trusting parties’) best
interests. Under general data protection frameworks that impose data
minimization requirements, organizations must typically ensure that
the data they are processing is adequate (sufficient to fulfil the stated
purpose), relevant (has a relevant link to that purpose), and limited to
what is necessary (collecting and holding only that which is needed for
that purpose).64 A duty of loyalty could provide a value-laden baseline
that requires an examination of not just the purpose of the collection
but also elevates the interests of those affected by the collection. While
parties at an arm’s length might act opportunistically in collecting as
much data as possible, trusted parties remain loyal by leaving all data
that, if collected, would conflict with the trusting parties’ best interests
on the table.
2. Loyal Personalization
The modern Internet routinely and systemically treats people
differently based upon personal information or characteristics.
Targeted and behavioral advertising is the most prominent example of
this, but first-party product and streaming recommendations, news
feeds, default settings, layouts, and more are all designed automatically
to look and act differently based on people’s personal characteristics.
Some of this personalization, such as targeted recommendations for
networked connections based upon intentionally revealed data such as
where you work or attended high school, would probably be loyal.
Other personalization systems, however, such as those that wrongfully
discriminate or have a disparate impact on protected, marginalized, or
vulnerable groups of people, would likely conflict with that trusting
collective’s best interests. Subsidiary rules built around the concept of
loyal personalization could firmly and clearly address a systemic
problem in a way that traditional data protection frameworks have
been unable to mitigate.
3. Loyal Gatekeeping
Entrustees have a remarkable ability to facilitate third party access
to trusting parties and their data. They can do so through their APIs,
advertiser portals, fusion centers, and government backdoors. This
access is the source of most major platforms’ power. And everyone
wants a piece of the users. Advertisers clamor for their attention. Data
brokers and companies training AI models lust for their data. And

64 Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 5(c) 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 (EU) (providing the
GDPR’s data minimization principle).
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governments demand evidence. Entrustees have financial incentives
to build portals and facilitate access for third parties. Some access
granted by trustees to third parties is not in conflict with trusting
parties’ best interests. For example, contextual advertising usually
doesn’t significantly leverage people’s own data or limitations against
them, nor does it usually expose trusting parties to significant privacy
harms. Protocols for interoperability to help people transfer data from
one place to another also serve the interests (and wishes) of trusting
parties.
However, certain lax gatekeeping practices would be disloyal
because of how they endanger trusting parties by obscuring risk and
breaking promises while facilitating access to third parties for
organizational gains or to avoid costs. The three most resonant privacy
scandals in the past decade, the government surveillance revelations
by Edward Snowden, the FBI’s request that Apple help it bypass
encryption protections, and Cambridge Analytica’s massive Facebook
data exfiltration, all involved gatekeeping issues. Subsidiary rules built
around the concept of loyal gatekeeping would help resolve
longstanding debates around what obligations trusted organizations
have regarding third-party access through portals, APIs, interfaces, and
the automated scraping of websites. And in combination with a duty
of confidentiality, subsidiary rules could also help clarify when sharing
a trusting party’s data with third parties is disloyal.
4. Loyal Influencing
Technologies are artifacts built to act upon the world. Every
single design decision made in the creation of a website or app is
meant to facilitate a particular kind of behavior.65 The structure of
digital technologies will affect people’s choices even if the effect is not
intended by designers. When designers create a drop-down menu,
privacy settings, “I agree” buttons, and any other feature that
implicates people’s privacy, they are influencing them. They can’t
avoid it.66 Given their power, they should be loyal in exercising their
influence.
The most prominent example of disloyal influence involves
organizations leveraging “dark patterns” or “malicious interfaces”

65

See, e.g., LANGDON WINNER, THE WHALE AND THE REACTOR: A SEARCH FOR LIMITS
94 (1986).
66 See Cass R. Sunstein, The Ethics of Nudging, 32 YALE J. ON REGUL. 413, 421 (2015)
(“Human beings . . . cannot wish [choice architecture] away. Any store has a design; some
products are seen first, and others are not. Any menu places options at various locations.
Television stations come with different numbers, and strikingly, numbers matter, even when
the costs of switching are vanishingly low; people tend to choose the station at the lower
number, so that channel 3 will obtain more viewers than channel 53.”).
IN AN AGE OF HIGH TECHNOLOGY
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which are user interface elements meant to influence a person’s
behavior against their intentions or best interests.67 Companies deploy
effort traps to make deleting an account confusing and difficult. They
make “cancel” buttons hard to see and press, they obscure important
details in tiny fonts or walls of boilerplate, and they leverage our deeply
entrenched and empirically validated overconfidence regarding risk,
deference for conformity, endowment effects, status quo bias, and
other biases and mental shortcuts to manipulate us to their ends.
Jamie Luguri and Lior Strahilevitz have observed that “dark patterns
are strikingly effective in getting consumers to do what they would not
do when confronted with more neutral user interfaces.”68

67 See, e.g., HARTZOG, supra note 22, at 148, 162; Jamie Luguri & Lior Jacob
Strahilevitz, Shining a Light on Dark Patterns, 13 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 43 (2021); Ryan Calo,
Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995 (2014); Gregory Conti & Edward
Sobiesk, Malcious Interfaces and Personalization’s Uninviting Future, IEEE PRIV. & SEC.,
May/June 2009, at 72, 73; JOHANNA GUNAWAN, DAVID CHOFFNES, WOODROW HARTZOG &
CHRISTO WILSON, TOWARDS AN UNDERSTANDING OF DARK PATTERN PRIVACY HARMS (2021);
Harry Brignull, Dark Patterns: Deception vs. Honesty in UI Design, A LIST APART (Nov. 1, 2011),
https://alistapart.com/article/dark-patterns-deception-vs-honesty-in-ui-design/
[https://perma.cc/4VBK-HEEG]; COLIN M. GRAY, YUBO KOU, BRYAN BATTLES, JOSEPH
HOGGATT & AUSTIN L. TOOMBS, THE DARK (PATTERNS) SIDE OF UX DESIGN (2018);
Arunesh Mathur, Gunes Acar, Michael J. Friedman, Elena Lucherini, Jonathan Mayer,
Marshini Chetty & Arvind Narayanan, Dark Patterns at Scale: Findings from a Crawl of 11K
Shopping Websites, 3 PROCEEDINGS ACM HUM.-COMPUT. INTERACTION 81 (2019); ARUNESH
MATHUR, JONATHAN MAYER & MIHIR KSHIRSAGAR, WHAT MAKES A DARK PATTERN. . . DARK?
(2021); Christoph Bösch, Benjamin Erb, Frank Kargl, Henning Kopp & Stefan Pfattheicher,
Tales from the Dark Side: Privacy Dark Strategies and Privacy Dark Patterns, 4 PROC. ON PRIV.
ENHANCING TECHS. 237, 248 (2016); Ari Ezra Waldman, Cognitive Biases, Dark Patterns, and
the ‘Privacy Paradox’, 31 CURRENT OP. PSYCH. 105, 105, 107–09 (2020).
68 Luguri & Strahilevitz, supra note 67, at 46 (emphasis omitted). Luguri and
Strahilevitz found that
[r]elatively mild dark patterns more than doubled the percentage of consumers
who signed up for a dubious identity theft protection service, which we told our
subjects we were selling, and aggressive dark patterns nearly quadrupled the
percentage of consumers signing up. In social science terms, the magnitudes of
these treatment effects are enormous.
Id. They further found that
the most effective dark pattern strategies were hidden information (smaller print
in a less visually prominent location), obstruction (making users jump through
unnecessary hoops to reject a service), trick questions (intentionally confusing
prompts), and social proof (efforts to generate a bandwagon effect). Other
effective strategies included loaded questions and making acceptance the
default. . . . In many cases, consumers exposed to dark patterns did not
understand that they had signed up for a costly service. These results confirm the
problematic nature of dark patterns and can help regulators and other watchdogs
establish enforcement priorities.
Id. at 47.
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Lawmakers have struggled for years to articulate when attempts at
persuasion become harmful.69 But trusting parties do not need to be
injured for entrustees to violate a duty of loyalty. Subsidiary rules
around disloyal attempts to influence would address the most
pernicious and dangerous dark patterns head-on.70 Lawmakers should
focus on how the design is meant to take advantage of a person’s
limitations or vulnerabilities to benefit the designer in a way that is
against the best interests of the trusting party.71
5. Loyal Mediation
Certain kinds of organizations design their platforms so that their
users interact not just with the organization itself, but with each other.
In other words, they mediate people’s social and market experiences
with other people using their service. Sometimes this is a great
experience for people who use these services. But things can go off
the rails quickly as companies feel pressured to achieve continual and
endless growth. They create systems that reward virality and the most
outrageous or venomous hot takes instead of the ostensible purpose of
meaningful social interaction and social, emotional, and intellectual
nourishment. They optimize their algorithms and interfaces to reward
our most impulsive and petty reactions. Amplification of certain kinds
of information combined with strategically reduced or increased
transaction costs to speak, report harmful and dangerous speech, and
hide from other users leads to acute individual harms like harassment72

69 See id. at 104; see also Daniel Susser, Beate Roessler & Helen Nissenbaum, Online
Manipulation: Hidden Influences in A Digital World, 4 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 1, 3 (2019) (“[A]t
its core, manipulation is hidden influence—the covert subversion of another person’s
decision-making power. In contrast with persuasion, which is the forthright appeal to
another person’s decision-making power, or coercion, which is the restriction of acceptable
options from which another person might choose, manipulation functions by exploiting
the manipulee’s cognitive (or affective) weaknesses and vulnerabilities in order to steer his
or her decision-making process towards the manipulator’s ends.”).
70 Luguri and Strahilevitz recommend a multi-factor test to help determine when dark
patterns cross the line
that looks to considerations such as (i) evidence of a defendant’s malicious intent
or knowledge of detrimental aspects of the user interface’s design, (ii) whether
vulnerable populations—like less educated consumers, the elderly, or people
suffering from chronic medical conditions—are particularly susceptible to the
dark pattern, and (iii) the magnitude of the costs and benefits produced by the
dark pattern.
Luguri & Strahilevitz, supra note 67, at 99.
71 Balkin has proposed looking to “techniques of persuasion and influence that (1)
prey on another person’s emotional vulnerabilities and lack of knowledge (2) to benefit
oneself or one’s allies and (3) reduce the welfare of the other person.” JACK M. BALKIN,
HOOVER INST., FIXING SOCIAL MEDIA’S GRAND BARGAIN 4 (2018).
72 See DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE (2014).

384

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW REFLECTION

[VOL. 97:5

as well as systemic harms like polarization, reduced ability to engage in
self-governance, negative public health outcomes, and chilling effects
for large groups of vulnerable users.
A duty of loyalty cannot solve all of the complex problems of
content moderation or harassment. As we have maintained, a duty of
loyalty is merely one important tool in a larger toolkit. But companies
do have remarkable power to influence how people using their systems
interact with each other.73 When they use this power in a way that
conflicts with the best interests of their users in order to optimize
growth, they are being disloyal. Subsidiary rules for loyal mediation
are, of course, complicated because of the potentially conflicting
interests amongst actors and those potentially adversely affected by the
act. One trusting party wants to speak while the other(s) is made worse
because of it. This is where our proposed systemic focus and the
traditional fiduciary law method of developing a hierarchy of loyalties
would help clarify lawmakers’ actions.
CONCLUSION
Duties of data loyalty will take time and effort to meaningfully
implement as a part of U.S. privacy law. Data loyalty is a significant and
necessary departure from privacy law’s ineffective notice and consent
approach. But lawmakers can confidently embrace loyalty and other
relational duties as part of a holistic approach to mitigating the power
and abuses of data collectors. If done clearly, carefully, and with
commitment, lawmakers can chart a bold new vision for our privacy
rules that is capable of nurturing a sustainable and flourishing future
for those who share their personal information as well as those
entrusted with it.

73 Id. at 25; see also Hartzog & Richards, Privacy’s Constitutional Moment, supra note 5,
at 1695.

